由 jpichiban 
越南新任领导人苏林在就任后立即访问中国，并将于中国领导人习近平会面。 此次访问是苏林首次出访，也引发了外界对中越关系的关注。 尽管中越在南海问题上存在争议，但越南保持与中国积极互动，同时也积极寻求与其他国家合作。 越南采取“竹子外交”政策，既保持与中国的友好关系，也确保自身不会过度依赖中国。 苏林此次访华也为中国提供了一个投资新领导人的机会，中国希望巩固与越南的关系。
Original Title: 越南领导人苏林上任后立刻访华 “竹子外交”下一篇章待观察
Summary: Vietnam’s new leader To Lam will visit China for three days this Sunday (August 15), and will meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, according to China’s Foreign Ministry. This is To Lam’s first foreign trip since taking office as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam in early August. His first choice of Beijing has again drawn attention to the relationship between the two communist countries, especially since several conflicts over sovereignty in the South China Sea have not subsided. Last week, Hanoi and the Philippines held their first joint coast guard drills in the Philippine Sea, prompting Beijing to retaliate by announcing a military exercise in the South China Sea just three days before the drills.
Gregory B. Poling, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US think tank that has long observed the political gamesmanship in South China Sea countries, told BBC Chinese that To Lam’s visit to Beijing was unrelated to last week’s exercise with the Philippine Coast Guard. “It will certainly be a source of anxiety for Beijing, but I doubt Hanoi cares much.”
Poling believes that Hanoi understands that any mechanism or action involving the “deepening of the US-Vietnam partnership” (such as cooperation with Manila) will be met with displeasure by Beijing, but it will continue to pursue this goal nonetheless. The reason is that Hanoi believes it is necessary to maintain active contacts with China, while also doing its utmost to build more external partnerships to ensure that it is not solely reliant on Beijing.
Ha Hoang Hop, a deputy senior fellow at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, a Singaporean think tank, emphasized to the BBC that Vietnam and China have a comprehensive strategic partnership, a positive partnership that reflects the mutual understanding of the two countries. He believes that regular high-level visits between the two countries, with a proactive attitude, will help strengthen the partnership. “Last week’s joint coast guard drills between Vietnam and the Philippines did not anger anyone.”
**”Bamboo Diplomacy”**
Similar to many ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, after the reunification of North and South Vietnam, Hanoi’s foreign policy principle has been “non-alignment.” In recent years, after Trump launched the US-China confrontation, Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper specifically stated that it would adhere to a “four noes policy” (including not participating in military alliances, not aligning with one country against another, etc.).
Former Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong, who recently passed away, put forward the “bamboo diplomacy” theory in 2016, explaining Vietnam’s position of welcoming cooperation with any country but not forming blocs. In 2021, he reiterated the meaning of bamboo diplomacy in an interview: “Vietnam’s diplomacy is like bamboo, the roots are firm, the body is strong, the branches are flexible, the foreign policy is flexible and wise, persistent and determined.”
In September 2023, Vietnam and the US established a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” drawing criticism from China. In December, Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, and Nguyen Phu Trong referred to Vietnam and Beijing as a “community of shared future,” with outside analysts at the time interpreting this as Vietnam once again practicing bamboo diplomacy, deftly balancing its strategic relationship with the two major powers, the US and China.
After Nguyen Phu Trong’s death, the 67-year-old To Lam took over. To Lam became the President of Vietnam in May 2024 and was appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam after Nguyen Phu Trong’s death.
Poling emphasized to the BBC about To Lam’s maiden foreign trip: “Every Vietnamese leader must visit China and maintain as positive a relationship as possible without sacrificing sovereignty or national interests. This is the reality of sharing a border with a huge neighbor that is sometimes aggressive.”
However, Yang Yikui, an assistant researcher at the National Defense Security Research Institute, a think tank under Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, previously told the BBC that the relationship between Vietnam and China is actually quite subtle. Although China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, Vietnam has a trade deficit with China of as much as $50 billion.
Militarily, Vietnam, as one of the claimants to sovereignty in the South China Sea, is concerned about China’s construction of an airstrip and deployment of military facilities on the Paracel Islands (called Hoang Sa Islands by Vietnam), as well as various measures to strengthen its actual control. Yang believes that Vietnam still harbors resentment towards China.
**China’s Vietnam Strategy**
When General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping visited Vietnam at the end of last year, Chinese news reports said the two sides agreed to build a “China-Vietnam community of shared future,” but the Vietnamese side used the term “Vietnam-China community of shared future.” Analysts pointed out that this highlights the fact that the two sides do not have a common understanding of the term “community of shared future,” and Vietnam’s attitude appears reserved.
According to public reports, between 2011 and 2024, former Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong held a total of eight meetings with CCP leader Xi Jinping in Hanoi and Beijing, including one in 2011 when Xi was still Vice President. Since then, both Xi Jinping and Nguyen Phu Trọng have sought to build a close relationship through special treatment.
After To Lam took over as President of Vietnam, he received Russian President Vladimir Putin in June and held talks with him. However, To Lam has not yet met with Biden since taking office. However, To Lam will also visit New York in September to attend the UN General Assembly, where he may meet with Biden.
So what are China’s strategic considerations in the face of its neighbor and “socialist brother” Vietnam, which is trying to build multi-party alliances?
Song Wendi, a China researcher at the Atlantic Council, a US think tank, explained to the BBC that after Nguyen Phu Trọng’s death, Beijing is actively seeking to strengthen the relationship between the two countries. Song said, for example, that Xi Jinping sent four members of the Politburo to publicly express condolences to Vietnam, and Wang Huning even went to Hanoi on behalf of Xi Jinping and the CCP Central Committee to offer condolences. The official media outlet “People’s Daily” sent a telegram, offering “deep condolences” on Nguyen Phu Trong’s death, and called Nguyen Phu Trong a “close comrade and sincere friend” of the Chinese people and the Communist Party of China.
Based on this, Song believes that these actions by Xi Jinping clearly show that China is hoping to seize the opportunity provided by the leadership change in Vietnam to improve Sino-Vietnamese relations, hoping to “bring Vietnam back to China’s orbit.” He told the BBC that considering the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House, US-Vietnam relations will also face more uncertainty, giving the new leadership in Hanoi more reason to “strategically hedge” between the US and China.
This face-to-face meeting between the leaders will be an opportunity for China to invest in Vietnam’s new leader To Lam. Song emphasized that by the standard of top leaders, To Lam’s resume is relatively weak, so if Beijing provides To Lam with high-level hospitality at this time, it will be seen as a vote of confidence by the CCP in To Lam, helping the newly appointed To Lam consolidate his political position, and To Lam may be grateful for this.
**This article was assisted by BBC Vietnamese journalist Thu Bui.**
Original article: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-69273258?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=KARANGA